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Abstract
This paper demonstrates that a proper design of environmental-regulation pric-
ing strategies is able to promote Extended Product Responsibility for green
supply chain firms in a competitive market. A differential game model compris-
ing Vidale-Wolfe equation has been established in light of sales competition and
recycling dynamics as well as regulation related profit function. Analytic solu-
tions of Markovian Nash equilibriums are provided with the necessary condition
derived from Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. We found that governments
should opt to gradually raise regulation standards so that rational manufac-
turers will gradually improve its product recyclability, and, in turn, Extended
Product Responsibility will get promoted.
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1. Introduction
Competitive strategies for firms and environmental regulations for govern-
ments jointly play an important role in dictating the success of implementing
Extended Product Responsibility (EPR) policies (Palmer and Walls, 1997; Rei-
jnders, 2003). At the same time, strategic management has long been considered
a significant part of business competitiveness. Most of existing reports, how-
ever, concentrate only on the impact of policies per se, rather than than on
the existence of market interaction. This paper, therefore, shed new light on
recycling policy designs under a more realistic market condition by the help a
differential game model.
Existing analysis of recycling policy – including Design for Environment
(DfE) incentives – are mostly based on a single company model (Fullerton and
Wu, 1998; Choe and Fraser, 2001; Stavins, 2002). From the literature, however,
we understand that consequence of incentive behave differently in a multiple
companies competition context (Jaffe et al., 1995; Vogelsang, 2002), and thus
the interactive effect of incentive policies and regulations needs to be reviewed.
Moreover, product pricing and manufacturing costs mostly determine the prof-
itability of a firm. Manufacturers accrue their profits by setting the right pricing
strategies with consideration for competitor responses and product character-
istics (Reijnders, 2003). Among the environmental policy literature, however,
while tax or subsidy pricing is often discussed, little attention is given to product
pricing and environmental friendly design policy (Ekins, 1999).
In recent years, EPR has attracted much attention and the notion of EPR
has been part of the concept of green supply chain. According to (Barde and
Stephen, 1997), EPR is defined as a strategy designed to promote the inte-
gration of environmental costs of products throughout their life cycles into the
market distribution mechanism so as to reduce product harm to the environ-
ment. A prosperous green supply chain can not be substantiated without the
help of proper incentives and public policies (Sheu et al., 2005; Sheu, 2008).
With the implementation of EPR policies in various supply chains, producer
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responsibilities have been extended from selling products to recycling them,
meanwhile pushing waste management issues to upstream manufacturers and
even the entire supply chain (Carter and Jennings, 2002).
In order to promote the concept of EPR, governments around the globe usu-
ally provide financial incentives for manufacturers and encourage them to engage
in EPR practices (Palmer and Walls, 1999). Appropriate incentive mechanisms
not only internalize externality by changing the cost structure for producers,
but they also drive manufacturers to develop more environmentally friendly
products. Moreover, although international prominence has shifted to product
sustainability, the subject of product design is still seen as one of the top pri-
orities for governments and manufacturers. When enterprises respond to strict
controls regarding their social responsibility, and at the same time begin to take
account of competitive pricing and manufacturing costs, it is often considered
difficult for them to determine a long-term profit strategy. Existing literature
has pointed out that, however, environmentally friendly designs can reduce ma-
terial use, enhance business competitiveness, and have other benefits, there is no
clear suggestions or practical consideration given as to how and to what extent
product design can be improved (Avila, 2006).
Effect of EPR incentive on green product design reacts differently from a
market with competitors. Member firms in a green supply chain, in every dy-
namic stage of the decision making process, attempt to estimate the actions
of their rivals and then identify what corresponding strategies can be used to
drive the firm toward a maximized profit situation. Such strategies, however,
are expected to coincide with environmentally friendly design from the views
of policy makers. To facilitate this process, we use a differential game model
to derive optimal design trajectories and to illustrate how manufacturers can
adopt optimal product green design and pricing strategies for pursuing maximal
profit whilst also complying with social responsibility.
Moreover, given that EPR cannot be executed directly, the notion of De-
sign for Environment (DfE) has been suggested instead (Walls, 2003; Spicer
and Johnson, 2004). The DfE, however, possesses broad coverage (Calcott and
3
Walls, 2005) and strives to integrate, in a systematic way, various aspects of
environment, health, and safety into the design phase of the production pro-
cess, while at the same time seeking to satisfy simple and easy disassembling
design criteria (Calcott and Walls, 2005; Walls, 2003). Given such broad senti-
ment, this paper focuses particularly on the recyclability of product green design
in the following three areas: ease of disassembly, usage of toxic materials, and
reusability of resources (Calcott and Walls, 2005), i.e., design for recycling (Kri-
wet et al., 1995). A prevalent definition of recyclability has been known as a
rate or percentage of recyclable material in a product composition (Duchin and
Lange, 1994; Huisman et al., 2003). This definition of recyclability has been
adopted in this paper.
There are various regulatory and financial incentive schemes. Globalized
organizations – including Apple, Sony, and Matsushita – invest a large portion
of their budgets in DfE activities in order to green their supply chain. The
motivation that drives these firms to implement DfE (Walls, 2003) appears to
lie in a combination of regulation and production cost (Palmer and Walls, 1999;
Avila, 2006; Iliyana, 2006; Gottberg et al., 2006). In order to compensate for
harm caused by the lack of flexibility in command and control, incentive mecha-
nisms can be a complement to maintaining industry growth (Jaffe et al., 1995).
Under these mechanisms, manufacturers are charged differently according to
their product’s characteristics in ease of handling. This price discrimination
is expected to regulate manufacturers’ environmental responsibility effectively.
Among existing incentive designs, product charges or taxes are levied against
products that causes environmental pollution prior to production to reflect the
externality costs (Barde and Stephen, 1997). We assume that different incentives
for firms largely result from differentiated processing fees charged by recycling
treatment agencies providing discriminated product recyclability (Duchin and
Lange, 1994). In other words, the fee schemes depend on the total amount of
scraps as well as the ease of handling in waste treatment and processing.
Comparing to previous literature, we provide a distinctive feature. We ex-
tend mixed incentive strategies to a broader view. This paper finds that, for
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manufacturers in competition, simultaneously offering financial incentives and
increasingly stringent regulation is necessary for promoting green product recy-
clability.
2. Competitive Differential Game Model
In attempting to address the effectiveness of EPR instruments in a compet-
itive environment, our model is built on top of a simplified situation in which
an integrated financial incentive and regulation standard is imposed. To mani-
fest the dynamic interaction, and for ease of illustration and analysis, we have
constructed a differential game model with sales and recycling dynamics. In
our model we assume that, for firms to be environmentally conscious, certain
regulation standards need to be imposed to reflect current social responsibility
(Foulon et al., 2002). Moreover, a certain amount of capital expenditure also
needs to be invested in order to comply with government standards (Cohen,
1999; Foulon et al., 2002).
(–Place Figure 1 approximately here–)
Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework and the game players for con-
structing our differential equations. xi(t) and ξi(t) represent the market share
and recycling rate of producer i at time t, respectively. The incentive is incorpo-
rated in recycling treatment fee ui(t), which is charged by the treatment agency
and depends on the product’s recyclability involvement di(t), e.g., the extent of
ease of disassembly. To implement a simplified financial incentive in our model,
a treatment agency directly charges manufacturers processing fees without in-
volving other third party agencies. In the close-to-real situation, there are other
agencies as intermediaries, for example, a Producer Responsibility Organization
(PRO) charges EEE manufacturers an amount of fees and establishes a fund to
operate the system perpetually. These intermediate third part agencies can be
incorporated in the future researches.
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To study the competitive behavior, i.e., time trajectories, of firms in a mar-
ket, we denote the opponents’ price decisions and market share as
p−i(t) = (p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pi−1(t), pi+1(t), . . . , pn(t)),
x−i(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xi−1(t), xi+1(t), . . . , xn(t)).
We normalize the market share xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] such that they sum up to unity
at any time instance
n∑
i=1
xi(t) = 1.
The sales dynamics can be suitably described by a set of differential equations
(1) with the form of Vidale-Wolfe (Prasad and Sethi, 2004).
x˙i(t) = fxi(xi(t), x
−i(t), p(t))
=
∑
j 6=i
ρjpj(t)
√
xi(t)−
∑
j 6=i
ρipi(t)
√
xj(t)− δ(xi(t)−
∑
j 6=i
xi(t)) (1)
All firms determine their product prices at very time instance in order to
conquer maximal market shares. Pricing decisions are made by responding
competitor reactions of prior price and market share changes. Prices differences
between products affect customer purchasing preferences, thereby causing sales
and market share deviation. Market share change rate x˙i of firm i in (1) con-
stitutes the influence from its own market share xi and the market share xj of
other products.
If manufacturers enhance their green product recyclability design, i.e., the
percentage of weight in their products been recycled, their product recycling
rate increases proportionately (Huisman et al., 2003). However, when reviewing
EPR policy literature, we found that the definition of the recycling rate between
countries is not limited to a specific context. Modalities of the recycling vary
in countries, but the aim of reducing waste remains consistent. The WEEE
Act has had the most far-reaching influence on national laws (Huisman et al.,
2003). It clearly regulates that: (1) the re-use and recycling rate be up to 75%,
and (2) the resource recovery rate be up to 80% of the weight of each recovery
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(Yamaguchi, 2002). In this case, the recycling rate amounts to the recycled
weight percentage with respect to total disposal.
To relate to the EPR, the responsibility elasticity to unfulfilled recycles (Jalal
and Rogers, 2002) is defined as
α =
∂M
M
∂τ
τ
(2)
where M = 1 −∑ni=1 ξi represents unfulfilled recyclables, ignored by all man-
ufacturers, and τ represents producer responsibility in a country. For example,
α = −2 means unfulfilled waste will decrease 2% as responsibility increases 1%.
Every country may develop different social responsibility levels. This simply
reflects the average environmental consciousness and regulation stringency in a
particular society. From the definition in (2), therefore, we have
M = τα (3)
Let ξi(t) and di(t) represent the recycling rate of product i and the recy-
clability involvement of product i, respectively. Motivated by diffusion models
in marketing and the consequence of new product sales (Dockner and Fruchter,
2004), the recycling dynamics can be suitably described through (4)
ξ˙i(t) = (η + εidi(t)/τ)
√
xi(t)(1 −
n∑
i=1
ξi(t)) (4)
The influence of the dynamics of the recycling rate constitutes recyclability,
the producer responsibility acting on market share and any unfulfilled recycling
weight. The resulting behavior follows an S-shape dynamics. At lower rates
of recycling, the improvement appears to be slow. When the recycling rate,
however, increases to some extent, it starts to rise dramatically. Eventually, as
most of the materials are recyclable, it becomes more difficult to improve the
recycling rate.
The above two dynamics collectively describe the behavior of a recycling
system in a competitive environment. The sales dynamic points out that when
manufacturers commence a price war in the market, sales volume rises in conse-
quence. More sales, however, leads to more waste, so that manufacturers need to
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take heavier responsibility for recycling (Barde and Stephen, 1997; Sheu et al.,
2005). In this case, manufacturers may be more willing to engage in product
design recyclability in order to alleviate increasing costs.
In order to provide the conceptualization terse and to simplify consequent
derivations, we aggregate all ξi(t) to an single τ(t) (Dockner and Fruchter, 2004).
By summing up all ξ˙i of (4), the recycling dynamics can be easily transformed
to
ατ˙ (t) = −ητ(t)−
n∑
i=1
εidi(t)
√
xi(t) (5)
In order to pursue profit maximization, we assume revenue to be solely
generated by selling products, while costs are accrued from multiple sources –
such as, production cost wi(xi(·)), production process upgrading cost hi(di(·)),
recycling fee ui(di(·)) paid to the treatment agency, and capital expenditure
n(τ(·); ζ(·)) made to comply with the government regulation standard −ζ(·)
(Jaffe et al., 1995). Upgrading costs includes R&D investment, costs incurred for
altering production processes, and costs associated with consuming recyclable
materials (Mukhopadhyay and Setaputra, 2007). In this paper we assume n is
linear in ζτ , which represents the environmental regulation standard determined
by producer responsibility in a society. The net profit amounts to the difference
between sales revenue and all accrued costs and can be written as (6) with the
notion of NPV, where ri is the discount rate and assumed to be constant.
Ji(pi(·), di(·)) =
∫ T
0
e−rtF (xi(t), τ(t), pi(t), di(t), t)dt (6)
where
F (xi(t), τ(t), pi(t), di(t), t)
= νi(xi(t), pi(t))− ci(xi(t), τ(t), di(t))
= νi(xi(t), pi(t))− wi(xi(t))− hi(di(t))− ui(xi(t), di(t))− ni(τ(t); ζ(t))
To keep the problem explicit, some assumptions are imposed regarding to
the behavior of manufacturers:
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1. We are dealing with a differential game with simultaneous decision making
(Dockner et al., 2000). Every player is rational and seeks to maximize their
objective functional.
2. All products are homogeneous but companies are not. Each firm has its
own cost structure and ability to attract customers from its competitors.
3. There is only one representative treatment agency and it makes no profit
in our system. It offers incentives by charging manufacturers differently
according to the level of recyclability.
With the implementation of incentives and regulations, manufacturers con-
stantly ponder how to re-allocate costs more effectively and select suitable re-
cyclability involvement in order to achieve their own profit maximization. With
the optimization problem of competing parties, our differential game model
solves the Markovian Nash equilibrium. This occurs when a participant in a
game speculates the optimal strategy of other participants to find his own opti-
mal strategy. This strategy gives no motivation for all rational participants to
deviate from this equilibrium (Dockner et al., 2000).
Let φi(xi, τ, t) denote a Markovian strategy of producer i. A Markovian
Nash equilibrium satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations (7).
riVi = max
pi,di
{νi(xi, pi)− ci(xi, τ, di)+
Vixx˙(xi, x
−1, pi) + Viτ τ˙ (xi, τ, di)}, i = 1, 2, (7)
where the notation Vix presents the partial derivative of Vi with respect to x,
i.e., ∂Vi/∂x. Expand the HJB (7) to (8)
riVi = max{νi(xi, pi)− hi(di)− ui(xi, di)− ni(τ ; ζ)+
Vix(ρ2p2
√
x− ρ1p1
√
1− x− δ(2x− 1))+
Viτ
1
α
(−ητ − ε1d1
√
x− ε2d2
√
1− x)}, i = 1, 2. (8)
Taking maximization with respect to pi and di on the right-hand side of (8)
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yields
∂νi
∂pi
− Vixρi
√
1− xi = 0 (9)
−∂hi
∂di
− ∂ui
∂di
− Viτ εi
α
√
xi = 0 (10)
The resulting Markovian Nash equilibriums of (9) and (10) represent the
optimal pricing and design strategies for each firms. We further assume that
the revenue function νi(xi(·), pi(·)) is linear in xi(·) and quadratic in pi(·) and
the upgrading cost of recyclability design hi(di(·)) is quadratic in di(·) and the
processing fee ui(xi(·), di(·)) is linear in (1 − di(·))
√
xi(·), and then we have
∂hi
∂di
= Chidi and
∂ui
∂di
= Cui
√
xi.
The Markovian Nash equilibriums follow:
p∗i =
ρi
Kνi
Vix
√
1− xi (11)
d∗i =
εiViτ
α
+ Cui
Chi
√
xi ≡ Fi√xi (12)
The HJB condition provides a necessary condition for evaluating the Marko-
vian Nash equilibrium trajectories. In order to explore the sufficient condition
in the future research, further restrictions with special structure in the cost
function are urged to be imposed (cf. Dockner et al. (2000)).
The equilibriums are subgame perfect if they are autonomous (Dockner et al.,
2000). From the derivation in the appendix, our solution trajectories are au-
tonomous, that is,
p∗i (t) = φ
i
pi
(xi(t), τ(t), t) = φ
i
pi
(xi(t), τ(t)), (13)
d∗i (t) = φ
i
di
(xi(t), τ(t), t) = φ
i
di
(xi(t), τ(t)). (14)
Applying the Markovian Nash equilibrium (11) and (12) into the HJB equa-
tions (7), we are then able to solve the Markovian Nash equilibriums with the
Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equations (15).
riVi ={νi(xi, φipi(xi, τ))− ci(xi, τ, φidi(xi, τ))
+ Vixx˙i(xi, x
−1, φipi(xi, τ)) + Viτ τ˙ (xi, τ, φ
i
di
(xi, τ))},
i = 1, 2. (15)
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In a competitive environment, gaining product recyclability is deliberate.
A firm often expands its market share by offering prudent price promotion
in order not to cause their rivals to fight-back. The small increase in sales
gradually costs the manufacture extra fees to process the waste. This excess
cost, however, tends to eliminate the benefit of price promotion and give rise to
a more conservative promotion strategy. In other words, a producer can choose
to sell less in exchange for lower processing fees without engaging in any product
design changes, even though an intensive incentive program has been realized
in a market.
According to the aforementioned assumption, and for the purpose of illus-
tration, we explicitly set the parameter functions as
ν1(x, p1) = Cν1x+
1
2
Kν1p
2
1, (16)
ν2(x, p1) = Cν2(1− x) +
1
2
Kν2p
2
2, (17)
h1(d1) =
1
2
Ch1d
2
1, (18)
h2(d2) =
1
2
Ch2d
2
2, (19)
u1(x, d1) = Cu1(1− d1)
√
x, (20)
u2(x, d2) = Cu2(1− d2)
√
1− x, (21)
n(τ ; ζ) = Enζτ. (22)
where production costs w1 and w2 have been merged into the expression of Cν1
and Cν2 , respectively. Our main problem therefore can be rewritten explicitly
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as
max
p1,d1
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
Cν1x+
1
2
Kν1p
2
1 −
1
2
Ch1d
2
1 − Cu1(1− d1)
√
x− Enζτ
]
dt (23)
max
p2,d2
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
Cν2 (1− x) +
1
2
Kν2p
2
2 −
1
2
Ch2d
2
2 − Cu2 (1− d2)
√
1− x− Enζτ
]
dt
Subject to
x˙ = ρ2p2
√
x− ρ1p1
√
1− x− δ(2x− 1) (24)
ατ˙ = −ητ(t) − ε1d1
√
x− ε2d2
√
1− x (25)
x(0) = x0 (26)
τ(0) = τ0 (27)
(28)
Proposition 1. For the competition described by (16)–(25), the optimal recy-
clability in the Markovian Nash equilibrium is a non-decreasing functional of
the market share. That is,
∂d∗
i
(·)
∂xi(·)
≥ 0.
(Please refer to appendix for proof.)
Under the Markovian Nash equilibrium, the market share trajectories are
not necessarily increasing, instead, it follows the sales dynamics controlled by
optimal pricing, so that recyclability cannot be guaranteed to be improved. In
the case of a market share trajectory not increasing, the government cannot
drive producers to a state of higher recyclability without other effective policy.
On the other hand, the government can demand all producers take more product
responsibility through making the necessary capital investment – for example,
production process reconstruction for total waste reduction. This additional
expenditure can change the cost structures of manufacturers and force them to
reduce costs in other ways, as there is often no room to raise the sales price
in a competitive market. In order to meet government standards and take
advantage of available incentive programs, a certain degree of product design
change needs to be performed – such as easy-disassembly, or increasing the
percentage of recyclable components. Observing the behavior of our model, we
conjecture that if the government forces producers to adopt a higher standard of
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Table 1: Experiment 1: Parameter settings for comparison scenarios.
ρi i δ α η r Cνi Kνi Chi Cui ζ x0 τ0
0.3 -2 -0.8 0.08 -10 0.8 0.8
firm1 0.3 1.1 10 0.1 36 18
firm2 0.3 1.1 10 0.1 36 18
responsibility in recycling waste, producers appear to be more environmentally
conscious.
Proposition 2. For the competition described by (16)–(25), the optimal recy-
clability in Markovian Nash equilibrium is a non-decreasing functional of the
regulation stringency (negative of ζ). That is,
∂d∗
i
(·)
∂ζ(·) ≤ 0.
(Please refer to appendix for proof.)
We understand that financial incentives behave differently in a competitive
environment (Vogelsang, 2002). This paper explains the elaborate interaction
between market share, pricing and product design. We demonstrate our research
findings by two experiments – one comparing the effectiveness of fixed versus
increasing policy stringency and the other one showing the performance with
various policy stringency. Our propositions can be illustrated and reviewed in
Figure 2 with the related parameter settings in Table 1.
Based on the parameter settings, the optimal state trajectories follows
x˙ = −(2ρ1R1
√
T+ 2ρ2R2
√
TX
1 + X
+ 2δ)x+ 2ρ1R1
√
T
1 + X
+ δ,
ατ˙ = −ητ − (ε1F1 − ε2F2)x− ε2F2,
x(0) = x0,
τ(0) = τ0.
(–Place Figure 2 approximately here–)
There are two designate scenarios expressed in Figure 2. The scenario with
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Table 2: Experiment 2: Profit and recyclability increase with stringent rates increased.
Stringent
rate vζ
Profit
J1
Profit
J2
Final Re-
cyclability
d∗1(T )
Final Re-
cyclability
d∗2(T )
0.0 933 931 5.96 4.21
0.5 892 896 7.03 4.95
1.0 847 859 8.09 5.69
1.5 798 821 9.16 6.43
2.0 744 780 10.2 7.16
2.5 687 738 11.3 7.90
3.0 626 693 12.3 8.64
3.5 561 647 13.4 9.38
4.0 492 599 14.5 10.1
4.5 419 549 15.5 10.8
fixed policy stringency is of dash lines. The other scenario is of solid lines.
Based on the suggestion of the Markovian Nash equilibriums, the market share
of firm 1 decreases while that of firm 2 increases. Both of their profit rates,
however, are increasing. As the market share of firm 1 decreases, in order to
keep suitable profits, its optimal product recyclability strategy will decreases as
well. That is, in this case, firm 1 stops making improve to their product design
for environment.
On the other hand, their behaviors can be altered by a deliberate policy
design. We mark the results of the increasing policy stringency scenario as solid
lines in Figure 2. Observing this figure, the optimal recyclability for firm 1 in-
creases as the regulations become more stringent, regardless of its losing market
share. In this case, producers will to take more responsibility for environmental
protection. Therefore, the goal of increasing producer responsibility has been
achieved.
In order to manifest the influence of regulation stringency, we conduct an-
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other experiment using the parameter set as previous experiment. The Recy-
cling performance changes can be observed by changing the rate of stringency.
We let the the regulation standard gradually raised by (29).
ζ = ζ0 + vζ(1− exp(−t)). (29)
The regulation grows with a rate of vζ . As shown in Table 2, all parameters
remain unchanged in the second experiment and ten levels of rate vζ have been
employed in this experiment. In spite of profit decreasing as the regulation
becomes more stringent, the recyclability of both firms increases significantly.
Under this policy, manufacturers are therefore endowed with motivation to en-
hance their product design.
3. Conclusions
This paper is different from existing works in that it analyzes the interac-
tive effects of financial drivers and environmental policies through a dynamic
approach. This paper integrates existing differential game models and estab-
lishes a novel dynamics analysis that encourages product recyclability. Taking
time and competitors’ reactions into consideration, the conditions that drive
manufacturers to enhance product recyclability have been identified.
This paper makes a contribution on the EPR effectiveness issue in a com-
petitive market. Based on the results of this paper, governments should opt to
gradually raise regulation standards so that rational manufacturers will imple-
ment the correspondingMarkovian strategies, i.e., gradually improve its product
recyclability. On the other hand, more incentive benefits nevertheless need to
be provided where the regulation standard is fixed, in order to urge businesses
to achieve the same level of recyclability as in the case of rising standards.
This conclusion cannot be reached without considering the interactive behavior
among competitive firms.
Our results further indicate that governments should consider the effective-
ness of environmental policy on the premise that it is nature for business to
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pursue maximal profits. In order to develop EPR among industries, the first
priority of the government should be to enact laws or regulations with rising
standards to complement available financial incentive programs. Moreover, to
make our differential game model closer to reality, future research can be con-
ducted with other types of treatment agencies, such as Producer Responsibility
Organization (PRO), private treatment agencies and the issue of illicit disposal
of informal sectors.
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Appendix
for Proposition 1 in conditions of recyclability. Given the results of (11), apply
the function form (16) to (25), the equations (11) and (12) expand to
p1 =
ρ1
Kν1
V1x
√
1− x (30)
p2 =
ρ2
Kν2
V2x
√
x (31)
d1 =
ε1
α
V1τ + Cu1
Ch1
√
x ≡ F1
√
x (32)
d2 =
ε2
α
V2τ + Cu2
Ch2
√
1− x ≡ F2
√
1− x (33)
Substitute the Markovian strategies (30) to (33) into (8) and then we have
the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
rV1 =Cν1x−
ρ21
2Kν1
V 21x(1− x)
− 1
2
Ch1F
2
1x− Cu1F1x− Enζτ
− ρ
2
2
Kν2
V1xV2xx− V1xδ(2x− 1)
− η
α
V1τ τ − ε1
α
F1V1τx− ε2
α
F2V1τ (1 − x),
rV2 =Cν2 (1− x)−
ρ22
2Kν2
V 22xx
− 1
2
Ch2F
2
2x− Cu2F2x− Enζτ
− ρ
2
1
Kν1
V1xV2x(1− x)− V2xδ(2x− 1)
− η
α
V2τ τ − ε1
α
F1V2τx− ε2
α
F2V2τ (1 − x),
We conjecture that the value function Vi is linear in the state variables(Prasad
and Sethi, 2004).
V1 = A1 +B1x+ C1τ,
V2 = A2 +B2(1− x) + C2τ.
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Therefore V1x = B1, V1τ = C1, V2x = B2 and V2τ = C2. The HJ equations
expand to
rA1 + rB1x+ rC1τ =
− ρ
2
1
2Kν1
B
2
1 + δB1 −
ε2
α
F2C1
+ (
ρ21
2Kν1
B
2
1 − 2δB1 −
ρ22
Kν2
B1B2 − 1
2
Ch1F
2
1
− (Cu1 +
ε1
α
C1)F1 +
ε2
α
F2C1 + Cν1)x
+ (− η
α
C1 − Enζ)τ,
rA2 + rB2x+ rC2τ =
− ρ
2
2
2Kν2
B
2
2 − δB2 −
ε1
α
F1C2
+ (
ρ22
2Kν2
B
2
2 + 2δB2 −
ρ21
Kν1
B1B2 − 1
2
Ch2F
2
2
− (Cu2 +
ε2
α
C2)F2 +
ε1
α
F1C2 + Cν2)(1 − x)
+ (− η
α
C2 − Enζ)τ.
Equating powers of x and τ , some of the unknowns can be easily solved as
A1 =− 1
r
(
ρ21
2Kν1
B
2
1 − δB1 +
ε2
α
F2C1),
A2 =− 1
r
(
ρ22
2Kν2
B
2
2 + δB2 +
ε1
α
F1C2),
C1 =C2 = − Enαζ
αr + η
,
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Let
R1 =
ρ21
2Kν1
, R2 =
ρ22
2Kν2
,
W =r + 2δ,
H1 =
ε1ζ
αr + η
,
H2 =
ε2ζ
αr + η
,
Z1 =− 3
2Ch1
(Cu1 −H1)2 −
1
Ch2
(Cu2 −H2)H2 + Cν1 ,
Z2 =− 3
2Ch2
(Cu2 −H2)2 −
1
Ch1
(Cu1 −H1)H1 + Cν2 .
To solve B1 and B2,
R1B
2
1 −WB1 − 2R2B1B2 + Z1 = 0,
−R2B22 −WB2 + 2R1B1B2 + Z2 = 0,
or
W(B1 +B2)
2 − (Z1 + Z2)2 = 0,
R1B
2
1 + R2B
2
2 − 2(R1 + R2)B1B2 + (Z1 − Z2) = 0.
Let
B1 = r cos θ,
B2 = r sin θ,
Applying the parameterization approach, the system of nonlinear equations
transforms to
r2(1 + sin 2θ) = ((Z1 + Z2)/W)
2, (34)
r2(1 +
1
2
R2 − R1
2R1 + R2
(1 − cos 2θ)) = (R1 + R2)((Z1 + Z2)/W)2 − (Z1 − Z2).
(35)
Set
S = ((Z1 + Z2)/W)
2,
T = (R1 + R2)((Z1 + Z2)/W)
2 − (Z1 − Z2).
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Divide 34 by 35 as
(T
2R2 + R1
2R1 + R2
− S) tan2 θ − 2S tan θ + T− S = 0.
Therefore
tan θ =
S±
√
S
2 − (T 2R2+R1
2R1+R2
− S)(T− S)
T
2R2+R1
2R1+R2
− S
≡ X
and
r = ±
√
T
1 + sin 2 tan−1 X
= ±
√
T(1 + X2)
(1 + X)2
Transform back to B1 and B2,
B1 = ±
√
T
1 + X
,
B2 = ±
√
TX
1 + X
,
The Markov Nash equilibriums follow
p∗1 = ±2R1
√
T
1 + X
√
1− x,
p∗2 = ±2R2
√
TX
1 + X
√
x,
d∗1 =
Enε1ζ
αr+η + Cu1
Ch1
√
x ≡ F1
√
x
d∗2 =
Enε2ζ
αr+η + Cu2
Ch2
√
1− x ≡ F2
√
1− x.
Therefore, the derivative of optimal recyclability di with respect to the mar-
ket share x becomes
∂d∗i
∂x
= Fi ≥ 0
for Proposition 2 with respect to stringency. Follow the results in Proposition
1, the derivative of optimal recyclability di with respect to ζ becomes
∂d∗i
∂ζ
=
Enεi
αr + η
≤ 0,
23
since α, η ≤ 0, and r, En, i ≥ 0.
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework and the game players in our model.
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Figure 2: Comparison of two scenarios for profits, market shares and Markovian Nash equi-
librium strategies.
